Abstract-As contemporary smart grid operation is expected to be heavily reliant on distributed microprocessorbased control, a strong need arises for interoperability standards to address the heterogeneous nature of the data in the smart grid. With the emergence of IEC 61850 as a strong industry-accepted interoperability standard, electronic instrument transformers and merging units are being utilized to digitize and transmit current and voltage measurements as Sampled Measured Values. Realizing the importance of feedback measurements for the reliable operation of the smart grid, firstly, this paper presents a detailed analysis of the Sampled Measured Values protocol and its benefits, then, it identifies its vulnerabilities and derives the associated cyber threats. Secondly, current security measures are outlined and, thirdly, the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to detect spoofed sampled values is investigated. It was shown that although neural network forecasters have high spoofed data detection accuracy, their performance decreases with the accumulation of forecasting error.
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet the requirements for automated smart grid control, wide range coverage of system data is required at fingertips for taking decisions in real-time and at different levels. Following the divide and conquer analogy, the smart grid is divided into smaller microgrids. Microgrids could operate autonomously, could support each other by exchanging power, and often, they sell to and buy power from the utility. This topology is decentralized by nature. Therefore, to properly manage the exchange of information in the heterogeneous and complex smart grid in an orderly fashion, a link to industrial standards with interoperable data structures and protocols is necessary [1] . The IEC 61850 standard has been the most widely industry-accepted standard, which provides a comprehensive data modeling and abstraction method that unifies data structure definitions across equipment from different manufacturers.
The IEC 61850 standard was developed by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee Number 57 Working Group 10 (TC57 WG10) and IEEE for Ethernet (IEEE 802.3)-based communication.
The IEC 61850 standard is well fit for decentralized and distributed control architectures, because it abstracts the definition of the service and data items to be independent from the underlying protocols. The abstracted data items and services can, thus, be mapped into any other communication protocol [2] . IEC 61850 maps the data to three different protocols, based on the application, namely: Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol, which is used for high-level control and automation functions, and the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Measured Values (SMV) protocols, that are used for realtime operations [2] . Of particular interest to us in this work is the SMV protocol and the concept of the process bus.
In industrial control networks, controllers acquire data about the surrounding environment through sensor readings, and then, issue control commands to actuators, accordingly. The IEC 61850 standard stipulations have introduced an intuitive method to make sensor measurements simultaneously available to all controllers in a control network by introducing the concept of the networked process bus. As shown in Fig. 1 , this is done by splitting the input and the output of control agents and their control logic, and placing a communication bus between them. By that, all system measurements are available in real-time on the process bus as Sampled Measured Values, and are properly classified with a unique identifier.
The SMV protocol has introduced a lot of advantages to smart grid control, such as data interoperability and reduced wiring complexity. However, it brought along several disadvantages, such as cyber threats [3] . Accordingly, the contributions of this paper are analyzing the SMV protocol and discussing its advantages and disadvantages. Then, outlining the cyber vulnerabilities and current security countermeasures. Finally, investigating the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to detect spoofed SMV measurements.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the related work. Section III presents an analysis of the SMV protocol and its advantages. Section IV discusses the vulnerabilities of the SMV protocol and the associated cyber threats. Section IV also outlines the current security measures are outlined. In Section V, the feasibility of using neural network forecasters is studied. Section VI concludes the paper II. RELATED WORK Machine learning techniques have been used in power systems for several purposes, such as load-demand forecasting and forecasting the production capacity of renewables [4] [5] . With the inrush of research directed towards cyber security of the smart grid, researchers have been continuously studying the use of machine learning for early attack detection.
We focus here on efforts related to detecting attacks on feedback loops, i.e. attack on sensor measurements. Generally speaking, the work in this area is could be classified into the following three categories:
1) Classification of false and legitimate measurement data
In [6] , the authors used supervised machine learning techniques to classify Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data as normal or attacked. In [7] the authors provided extensive analysis on supervised learning techniques for measurement data classification. They described each technique and analyzed its advantages and drawbacks. In [8] , a weighted least square based bad data detection algorithm is proposed to determine occurrences of failing current and voltage transformers. This system uses the stipulations provided by the IEC61850 standard to model the topology of a substation.
2) Detection by modeling previous attack activity
The work in [9] proposed an early warning system to forecast distributed denial of service attacks on wireless smart meter networks by modeling malicious activity as a Gaussian process. Similarly, [10] proposed an intrusion detection system for the smart meter infrastructure by utilizing data stream mining. The authors in [11] proposed a real-time intrusion detection system that is capable of classifying substation events as either real or fake using historical data.
3) Model-based attack detection
In [12] , the authors proposed a framework designed to be implemented to increase the integrity of automatic generation control data. In [13] , the authors used one-step-ahead state prediction to detect false data injection attacks on smart meter and PMU data. In [14] , the authors applied offline inspection for anomalies by incorporating the overall system variables using Markov models.
Due to the special nature of the SMV protocol, such as the high data rate and real-time requirements, analysis of the SMV protocol and the possible attacks will be introduced in the next section before outlining the countermeasures and the proposed defense technique.
III. THE SAMPLED MEASURED VALUES PROTOCOL

A. Structure of the SMV datagram.
An SMV datagram follows a modified Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) Basic Encoding Rules (BER) Tag/Length pair encoding scheme. As seen in Fig. 2 an SMV datagram is composed of two distinct fields: the packet header and the packet data. In the header, the SMV packet starts with the multicast destination address and the source's MAC address. IEC 61850-9-2, which covers the specifications for SMV messaging [15] , also recommends the implementation of VLAN and priority tagging based on IEEE 802.1Q followed by the Ethernet type and APPID field [16] . The datagram then includes the length and two reserved fields for future use.
In the SMV datagram data field, there can be several application protocol data units (ASDU), which are objects that contain relevant information for an individual node. Using several ASDUs allows a single device to send or receive physical sensor data from several nodes within the power system in the same datagram. The number of ASDUs is stored in noASDU [17] . Each ASDU then contains seven subfields which are as follows [18] : svID: Unique systemwide identification; DatSet: Value from the SV control block; SmpCnt: Counter that increments each time a new sampling value is taken; ConfRev: Value from the SV control block; RefrTm: The refresh time of the SV buffer; SmpSynch: A Boolean value that is true if the SV is synchronized by a clock signal and false if it is not; SmpRate: Value from the SV control block; Sample: List of data values related to the data set definition.
B. Overview of the SMV process bus benefits.
Generically, merging units are used to digitize the voltage and current measurements from potential and current transformers, respectively, and publish them as SMV messages to the process bus. In some situations, nonconventional instrument transformers directly publish measurements as SMV messages. As described in IEC 61850-9-2, and later in the 9-2 Light Edition, the SMV protocol broadcasts measurement data across a Local Area Network (LAN) using a switched Ethernet-network to communicate. SMV messages are directly mapped into the Data Link Layer, which is Layer 2 of the Open System Interconnect (OSI) model. The OSI model divides the network into seven abstraction layers with the goal of providing interoperability to computer networks. SMV messages that are broadcasted to the process bus are classified based on their svID field. Since SMV messaging follows the publisher/subscriber model, the controllers, that are commonly Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED)s, subscribe to SMV messages based on the svID. This means that the IED does not have to receive all the measurements on the process bus, rather it filters the required measurements based on their svID.
This architecture introduces a lot of advantages to the control and operation of individual microgrids, and eventually the smart grid, from different perspectives. Firstly, in terms of system monitoring, the networked process bus simplifies the connections required for monitoring systems, thus, improving the visibility of the power network [3] . Secondly, in terms of cost, the use of the process bus eliminates the need for point-to-point analogue connections. Therefore, this will drastically reduce the use of expensive copper wiring and will also reduce the cost of installation and maintenance. Thirdly, in terms of control, the SMV process bus facilitates the migration from centralized control network architectures to decentralized and distributed architectures that enhance the reliability of the power system. In centralized control, a single server communicates with all the sensors and issues most of the control commands. From a reliability view-point, the server is a bottleneck and a single point of failure. This vulnerability is avoided in decentralized and distributed control. Finally, in terms of data handling, the SMV process bus provides data interoperability between multi-vendor devices. By standard practice, all IEC 61850 SMV-compliant merging units and IEDs should abide by the message structure shown in Section III A. Therefore, the process bus is vendor-independent.
However, the benefits of the process bus do not come without risks. The following section will outline the vulnerabilities of the SMV protocol and current countermeasures efforts.
IV. THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND CURRENT SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we analyze the vulnerabilities of the SMV process bus in terms of cyber-attacks. We start by discussing the sources of attacks on the process bus. Then, for each attack type, we explain how the attack works, if the SMV process bus is resilient to it, and the possible countermeasures.
Despite its benefits, the process bus has vulnerabilities that need to be addressed to ensure its security. Since SMV are directly mapped to the data link layer of the OSI model, they are non-routable and non-blocking (i.e. one cannot block the original sender from sending SMV packets, unless the devise is disconnected from the network). Therefore, in this discussion, we consider the cyber threats that could potentially occur on the SMV protocol within a local area network.
The sources of attacks on an IEC 61850 network could be an inside person, who has access to the IEC 61850 network, and has the capability to infect the system with malware. This action could be intentional, from a disgruntled employee, or unintentional by improper use of infected devices. Another source of attack could start from the supply chain, where a device, IED, is infected with malware during production [19] . A savvy attacker could also penetrate a LAN through corporate networks or personal devices of the employees with techniques, such as password cracking, spam emails, and backdoors [20] . Two major public disclosures on successful attacks on industrial systems and power system control networks are the Stuxnet incident, where a nuclear plant control network was attacked, and the Crash Override incident, where several substation networks in the Ukrainian power grid were attacked [21] [22] .
Once the LAN is compromised, the attacker has the potential to launch several types of attacks on the SMV process bus.
1) Denial of Service (DoS)
accessing a service. One possible way to perform a DoS attack is by flooding the network to delay message delivery past the critical flooding rate through congesting the communication channel and exhausting the computation resources of the communicating nodes. Flooding attacks can happen on the network or the application layer of the OSI model. In this work, we are interested in DoS attacks on the process bus. A DoS by flooding the network could occur on the data link layer by broadcasting SMV messages with a high publishing rate, imposing delays on legitimate SMV messages beyond 3 ms. This form of DoS could be detected by classifying the SMV packets based on the APPID and monitoring the rate of publishing of each one on the process bus. According to IEC 61850-9-2LE, there are two allowed publishing rates for SMV messages, either 80 samples/sec or 256 samples/sec. If these rates are violated for a certain SMV, a DoS attack could be detected.
If an attacker, however, uses more than one physical or virtual device to publish SMV packet streams within the acceptable publishing rates, s/he could still congest the network. Here, the operator could create a list that defines the allowed svIDs and the corresponding data in the PDU. Utilizing an undefined svID is, thus, easily detected. Also, since each SMV is associated with a sample counter, if an attacker uses one or more the registered svIDs, the operator can detect repeated or out-of-sequence sample counters. This is because Layer 2 messages cannot be blocked. Finally, small and separated message bursts, which do not trigger the preset publishing thresholds, could also be detected by monitoring the sample counter.
2) Eavesdropping: this is a passive attack, where an attacker sniffs network traffic. Nonetheless, this attack allows the attacker to gain knowledge about the power system. For applications that are on the IP Layer and above, defense strategies against eavesdropping include encryption, such as utilizing Secure HTTP (HTTPS), Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), and Secure Shell (SSH). Defense mechanisms, such as monitoring network traffic and scanning network cards in promiscuous mode, could be used [23] .
However, in practice, and due to the timing limitations on SMV messages, they remain unencrypted. In fact, IEC 62351-6, which covers security for SMV, states that for applications using SMV and requiring 3 ms response times, multicast configurations, and low CPU overhead, encryption is not recommended [15] . Therefore, eavesdropping on the process bus is a cyber-threat, which leverages the capabilities of attackers.
3) Replay: in a replay attack, an attacker sniffs network packets and replays them at a later time. Since each SMV message is associated with a sample counter, and given the fact that Layer 2 messages cannot be blocked, a replay of SMV messages could be detected by monitoring the process bus for the messages with repeated sample counters or outof-sequence sample counters.
4) Man-in-the-Middle (MITM): a MITM attack occurs
when an attacker forces traffic between two communicating nodes to go through the attacker's machine before reaching the intended recipient. This is possible through Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poisoning.
ARP is a communication protocol used to convert IP addresses into MAC addresses [24] . In ARP Poisoning, the attacker sends an ARP Reply to fake the IP and MAC addresses mapping on the network. As such, the IP address of the attacker is, now, associated with an incorrect MAC address. This allows the attacker to intercept the messages exchanged between the communicating nodes. The attacker can, then, perform a MITM attack by manipulating the intercepted data.
Being broadcast Layer 2 messages, a MITM is not possible on the SMV protocol, except when a control network is physically compromised by a person from the inside.
5) SMV Spoofing: in this attack, an attacker publishes an SMV message, with manipulated data, to the process bus from his/her machine using the source MAC address of the original sender. This is possible because the process bus network is unencrypted. An attacker can sniff an SMV message, decode its fields, perform changes on certain fields, and publish the message back with a spoofed MAC address.
To defend against this attack, IEC 62351 recommends the use of RSA-based signatures to authenticate SMV packets and ensure their integrity. However, RSA-based authentication is unsuitable for the SMV protocol, which requires a 3 ms response time, since it is computationally expensive [25] [26] .
The use of a Hash-based Message Authentication Code is also recommended by IEC 62351, and it was found to have an average latency in the range of few hundred microseconds. As reported in [27] , this latency significantly increases with the message size. The latency studies in the literature were performed on processors with very high computational powers, such as Intel core i7 processors and FPGAs [27] [28] . This kind of processing power comes at the expense of high monetary costs and is not commonly available on IEDs and MUs, especially those devices currently available in the field.
Also, in multicast applications, such as SMV, MAC authentication does not provide non-repudiation [27] . That is, any subscriber can create a message and a MAC and send it as if they were the publisher. This of course, requires the attacker to know the secret key. Several attacks on the subject matter were reported in the literature, including length extension attacks, internal state attacks, key recovery attacks, and forgery attacks [29] [30][31.
If an attacker successfully sends a spoofed SMV message, which is verified by the subscriber, the attacker cannot stop the original publisher from sending the original SMV message. Therefore, the subscriber will have two SMV messages with either a repeated sample counter, or an out-ofsequence one. The problem that arises here is that the subscriber does not know which packet is valid and which packet is spoofed. The same logic applies to the replay attack. The IED will not know which message stream to use for the control operation to continue.
V. FEASIBILITY OF USING NEURAL NETWORK FORECASTORS TO DETECT SPOOFED MEASUREMENTS
It can be concluded from the previous discussion that the structure of the SMV protocol and the associated recommendations of the IEC 62351-6 make the SMV process bus resilient to several types cyber-attacks. However, devoting the necessary time and effort, savvy attackers can still perform SMV spoofing attacks to disrupt the operation of the power system.
As mentioned earlier, issuing a spoofed SMV will result in a repeated or out-of-sequence sample counter. However, the subscribing device will not be able to distinguish which message holds the true measurement value. Accordingly, this section studies the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to identify spoofed and legitimate messages.
As can be seen in Fig. 3 , the cyber layer detection engine is complemented by a physical layer forecaster. The cyber layer looks at standard stipulations, such as repeated sample counters, whereas, the physical layer represents to the ability of the forecaster to predict the value of the incoming SMV measurement, thus, being aware of the physical characteristics of the system.
A. SMV Spoofing Attack Formulation
With a fundamental understanding of the SMV datagram structure, it is possible to develop malware that specifically targets the measurement data sent along the process bus. In  Fig. 4 , we can see how the malware functions and how it is used to inject spoofed packets, with false data, into the process bus, while maintaining the header fields, which will make the packets seem legitimate. The malware was written in Python in conjunction with network sniffing and packet crafting libraries from Scapy.
When activated, the malware will sniff for packets on the LAN and wait until it has captured five SMV datagram packets. After it has captured a legitimate packet, it will strip the header information and save it for crafting malicious packets. The malware will then begin injecting fake measurements using these legitimate datagram headers. In essence, the malware will spoof the header and change the data field, which contains the raw measurements.
Once the data field has been altered, the malware, then, rebuilds the packet with the spoofed header, and publishes it on the process bus. The details of the construction of the malware are presented in [32] .
B. Neural Netowrk Forecasters To Detect Spoofed SMV
Packets.
In this study, a merging unit receives analogue measurements (via current transformers), digitizes them through its analogue to digital converter, and publishes them over the LAN as SMV packets. On the other hand, the control agent (or IED) subscribes to these measurements. If an anomaly in the sequence number field is detected, the control agents passes the two samples through the Neural Network Forecaster (NN-F). As will be detailed later, the NN-F utilizes N previous samples to forecast the value of the incoming measurement. The NN-F will compare the error between the received samples and the forecasted value. Only the received SMV, which has an error less than a specified threshold, will be marked as benign and is passed to the control logic.
The NN-F is a feedforward neural network composed of three layers: one input, one hidden, and one output layer. The input layer has 20 neurons corresponding to 20 previous samples, whereas the output layer has 1 neuron corresponding to the forecasted sample. The number of neurons in the hidden layer is 10.
The forecasting accuracy of the neural network against the computation time was studied. Based on this empirical study, it was found that 20 previous samples and 10 neurons in the hidden layer produce the highest accuracy in the least amount of time.
Generating the Training, Target, and Test Data Sets: the effectiveness of using neural network forecasters to distinguish spoofed from legitimate messages was studied on the microgrid setup shown in Fig. 5 . The model of the microgrid was developed on Matlab/Simulink to generate data for the contingency cases. Data corresponding to different simulated contingency events of the microgrid in this work were collected. These events include different fault events and other events, such as loss of transmission lines or generation units. The details of the microgrid model are given later in the paper.
Training the Neural Network: the neural network was trained with the back-propagation algorithm with a sliding window approach. Starting from the first sample, 20 samples were counted as input and the 21 st sample was set as the target output. Next, the window will move one sample, where the input will become samples 2 to 21, inclusive, and the target output is sample 22, and the process continues. The general process is depicted in Fig. 6 .
Setting the NN-F Decision Threshold: to set the decision threshold of the NN-F, Monte-Carlo simulations were performed for more than 2,500 test cases, each with 2001 measurement samples. For each of the test cases, random fake data was injected at different instants according to equation (1) . The fake data was ranging between -4 and 4 Amps, which is 1.5 times the rated current of the microgrid under study.
(1) Where 4 , 4 , and is pseudo-random number generator that produces a random number between 0 and 1. Then, the forecasting error of the neural network was recorded. It was found that a 2% decision threshold produces the highest accuracy in detecting spoofed samples. In this experiment, Loads 1 and 2 are set at 600 W. Each of the shown buses has three sets of three-phase inputs and outputs with relays and has its own potential and current transformer for measurements data collection. The DC microgrid is connected to the AC microgrid via a bidirectional inverter. A Distributed Energy Resource (DER) is present in the DC microgrid along with a 12-Ω DC resistive pulse load and a 60-Ω DC constant load. The AC and DC microgrids exchange power to support each other when necessary through setting the direct component of the current of the inverter's controller.
Description of the
The developed neural network forecaster was tested on fake SMV packets with current measurement values 1.5 times the rated current and above. As can be seen in Fig. 7 , the NN-F has a high accuracy in forecasting the incoming measurement value. The performed study shows that using a NN-F has good potential in identifying spoofed messages based on learning the system's characteristics; however, over time, forecasters are susceptible to the accumulation of the forecasting error. Knowing that, an attacker could publish spoofed messages such that they don't violate the 2% decision threshold. If the IED uses the fake message, the buffer used to forecast the incoming measurements will have a misleading entry. In this situation, the IED will become indecisive and will not know which packet to process and which one to discard. As can be seen in Fig. 8 , a small perturbation attack was performed on sample 1200. The NN-F utilized the fake sample (it has < 2% error) to forecast the next sample. This eventually resulted in the accumulation of the forecasting error before the NN-F.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the SMV process bus was analyzed. First, an overview of the process bus and its benefits was given. Next, the vulnerabilities of the SMV protocol were discussed and current security countermeasures were outlined. Then, the feasibility of utilizing NN forecasters to detect spoofed spoofed messages was studied. It was found that although they have high detection accuracy, they are prone to the accumulation of forecasting error. Since they have high potential in detecting spoofed SMV packets, as future work, the authors will look towards developing a new algorithm to enhance the resiliency of NN-F against the accumulation of forecasting errors. The authors will also compare the performance, in terms of accuracy and latency, of other types of NN, such as recurrent and deep learning NN.
. Fig. 7 : Performance of the NN-F. Fig. 8 : Performance of the NN-F with perturbation attack.
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